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We consider a small open economy in which the level of public education funding is 
determined by popular vote. We show that growth can be enhanced by the introduction of 
pay-as-you-go pensions even if the growth rate of aggregate wages falls short of the interest 
rate. The reason is that the PAYG system allows future retirees to partially internalize positive 
externalities of public education due to the positive effect of higher future labor productivity 
on their pension benefits. The majority support for education funding will be especially strong 
when the PAYG benefit formula is flat, i.e. progressively redistributive. This means that if a 
flat benefit PAYG pension system is in place then the economy will achieve the highest 
growth rate relative to the alternative pension system designs. We argue furthermore that 
while such PAYG pension system may be opposed by the majority of working individuals 
due to inferior returns to their pension contributions relative to a funded scheme, it is likely to 
be politically sustained by the coalition of retirees and lower income workers. 
JEL Code: D90, H23, H55, I28. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension schemes in which pensions are financed by con-
tributions from current workers have often been criticized as detrimental to growth. Ac-
cording to Feldstein (1974) such pension schemes have a negative effect on capital ac-
cumulation since they discourage private saving and, unlike in the case of a funded pen-
sion system, the payments into the PAYG scheme do not contribute to the national sav-
ing. Moreover, the implicit rate of return on contributions to a PAYG scheme typically 
falls short of the interest rate. Therefore according to such analysis, PAYG pension sys-
tems reduce per capita income. 
 
This standard argument is focused on physical capital accumulation and fails to take 
notice of the effect of PAYG pension systems have on the accumulation of human capi-
tal, particularly  through public education. Primary and secondary education  is now 
overwhelmingly publicly financed in all OECD countries, and universities also receive 
substantial  funding from public sources. Since PAYG pension schemes typically tie 
pension benefits of future retirees to the productivity of their contemporary workers, 
they create an incentive to support greater investment in the human capital of those fu-
ture workers.  Therefore if a PAYG pension scheme is introduced, its future beneficiar-
ies may become supportive of higher funding of public education via taxes since they 
will take into account the positive impact of aggregate human capital accumulation on 
their pensions. The resulting wage income growth may more than offset losses to eco-
nomic growth due to the negative effect on physical capital accumulation. This seems 
particularly likely in a world of integrated capital markets, where international capital 
flows substantially reduce the impact of national saving on factor prices and the supply 
of capital.  In fact, both the size of public PAYG pension schemes and the share of ex-
penditure on public education in GDP have grown substantially over the first decades 
after the Second World War in almost all OECD countries. This paper provides a possi-
ble explanation for this co-movement and offers a model representing an intergenera-
tional compact where a PAYG system supported by retirees compels the working gen-
eration, i.e. the future retirees, to support greater funding of public education, consistent 
with the analysis by Becker and Murphy (1988).   
 
To illustrate the potentially beneficial impact of a PAYG scheme in its simplest form, 
we analyze a small open economy in which savings do not affect the interest rate or the 
supply of capital. We argue that wage income growth in such an economy will generally 
be stronger under PAYG pension schemes, in comparison  to the fully funded pension   2 
systems. This can be true even if the return on PAYG contributions is below the interest 
rate.  
 
The concept that PAYG schemes provide an incentive for investing in public education 
has already been noted by Pogue and Sgontz (1977) as well as Becker and Murphy 
(1988) who also pointed out that this incentive is stronger for the middle and lower in-
come populations. This concept has become a common feature in the analysis of inter-
generational transfers in various contexts (Konrad, 1995; Kaganovich and Zilcha, 1999; 
Kemnitz, 2000; Boldrin, 2005; Poutvaara, 2006; Soares, 2006). For the environments in 
which parents finance the education of their children, including those where private and 
public channels coexist, it has been argued that positive growth effects of introducing a 
PAYG scheme can be expected because it helps relax parents’ liquidity constraints: see  
Kaganovich and Zilcha ( 1999), Lambrecht et al. ( 2005), Glomm and Kaganovich 
(2008).
2 The latter paper which focuses on the role of income heterogeneity underscores 
the point that the effect of relaxing liquidity constraint on educating children is particu-
larly strong in lower income families when PAYG pension benefits are redistributive.     
 
Another strand of the literature is concerned with normative aspects of linking public 
education and PAYG schemes. One efficiency argument for providing schooling pub-
licly lies in the impossibility to enforce transfer payments by children in exchange for 
financing education within the family (Sinn, 2004). But if altruism toward the young is 
weak, the level of public education may be chosen where the marginal return to invest-
ment in human capital exceeds the interest rate. In such a situation, PAYG pensions will 
enhance efficiency by fostering human capital accumulation. Rangel (2003) studies an 
intergenerational contract with public education and PAYG pensions aimed at restoring 
efficiency. Boldrin and Montes (2005) argue that these two parts of government inter-
vention can be used to replace the missing market for financing investment in human 
capital in an efficient fashion. Our paper can be seen as complementing this literature by 
pursuing a positive approach. It argues that the possible efficiency gains of increased 
education funding will be at least partly realized in a political economy framework.  
                                                 
2 Pecchenino and Utendorf (1999) reach an opposite conclusion for a model where edu-
cation is exclusively privately funded: PAYG social security will depress investment in 
both physical and human capital. This is so due to the negative income effect of social 
security payroll tax, under the assumption that the returns on social security contributi-
ons are inferior to returns on private savings for all individuals. It is important to obser-
ve, in particular, that when education is funded only privately by parents, they fail to 
internalize the impact of children’s education on the aggregate productivity of future 
workers and through it on the magnitude on the future PAYG retirement benefits.     3 
 
The contributions most closely related to ours are  those by  Kaganovich and Zilcha 
(2008) and Soares (2006). The former analyzes a closed economy setting where, similar 
to Boldrin (2005), voters take into account positive externalities of human capital accu-
mulation  for the future return on savings and pension contributions. It turns out that 
negative growth effects of introducing a PAYG scheme due to reduced physical capital 
accumulation will generally outweigh, in a fully closed economy, the positive growth 
effects of the enhanced human capital accumulation. Our present paper shows that these 
results may be turned around when one allows for international mobility of capital, such 
that the positive human capital effect dominates. Indeed, Soares (2006) notes that edu-
cation tax rates tend to be higher in an open economy, for a calibrated model with a dif-
ferentiated age structure, a mixed education system with public and private schooling, 
and labor-leisure choice. By considering a simpler framework, we are able to generalize 
his results, to demonstrate the existence of exceptions to this conclusion, to address the 
effects of alternative pension benefit formulas on education funding and growth, and to 
characterize the implications for the choice of the pension scheme. 
 
In our comparative analysis of growth implications of PAYG and fully funded pension 
systems we further distinguish between contribution-related and redistributive pension 
formulas which affect individuals differently depending on their position in the distribu-
tion of income. When the level of public education funding is politically determined and 
the income of the median voter falls short of the mean income, then  his children are 
subsidized through public education. Under certain conditions this implies that lower 
income voters exhibit stronger support for education funding. On top of that, the median 
voter may benefit through a public pension scheme if it is also redistributive, e.g. flat. 
We show that this subsidization effect of a flat pension formula can elicit majority po-
litical support for a relatively higher level of public education funding.
3   
 
We note that the growth implications of contribution-related vs. flat pension benefit 
formulae depend starkly on the tax structure. If education is financed by a payroll tax, 
then the median voter tends to be a worker earning below average wage. However, if 
education is funded via an income tax or a consumption tax, then a part of tax liability 
falls on the retirees who have little or no incentive to support education funding; there-
                                                 
3 This contrasts the conclusions in the literature dealing with growth impacts of pension 
systems when education is privately funded, which argues that contribution-related pen-
sion formulas, rather than those with flat benefits, particularly encourage human capital 
formation and growth (Kemnitz and Wigger, 2000; Docquier and Paddison, 2003).   4 
fore the median voter in this situation is likely to be among the above average wage 
earners. Consequently, the median voter would tend to be harmed by a redistributive 
benefit formula in a pension scheme, and would therefore support lower level of public 
education funding than under the corresponding contribution-related pensions. Our view 
that the elderly have a particularly low preference to finance public education is in line 
both with the empirical evidence (Poterba, 1997 and 1998) and theoretical studies 
(Gradstein and Kaganovich, 2004; Holtz-Eakin et al., 2004; Poutvaara, 2006).  
 
Thus our paper provides an analysis of inter- and intra-generational redistributional ef-
fects of alternative pension schemes when education is publicly funded, and of their 
implications for political support for education funding and growth.  One of our main 
results (Theorem 2), obtained under conditions characteristic of most developed econo-
mies, is  that a PAYG pension system with redistributive benefit formula yields the 
highest growth rate relative to the alternative pension system designs. Furthermore, we 
argue (Theorem 3 and the Corollary) that while such PAYG pension system may be 
opposed by the majority of working individuals due to its inferior returns on their pen-
sion contributions relative to a funded scheme, it is likely to be politically sustained by 
the coalition of retirees and lower income workers. Once in place, the PAYG system 
compels a majority of working individuals to support higher public funding of educa-
tion, and hence enhances economic growth. 
 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. After introducing the model in Sec-
tion 2, we investigate the impact of different benefit formulas within a given pension 
scheme on education funding and growth in Section 3. We build on this analysis in Sec-
tion 4 to obtain our main results comparing the implication  of funded and PAYG 
schemes for education funding and growth. In Section 5, we consider individual rates of 
return to social security contributions arising in different pension schemes and their im-
plication for preferences for and political sustainability of a pension scheme. The final 
Section 6 summarizes and discusses our findings.     
 
 
2. The basic model   
 
We consider an overlapping generations small open economy where perfectly competi-
tive firms produce a homogeneous good using human and physical capital as inputs in a 
constant returns neoclassical technology. Physical capital is internationally mobile and 
therefore the interest factor is exogenous from the vantage point of the small open econ-
omy. For simplicity but without essential loss of generality we postulate the  interest   5 
factor  R  to be stationary.  The constant returns technology then implies that the wage 
rate  w  per efficiency unit of labor (human capital) is also exogenous and stationary. 
 
Each individual in this OLG population lives for three periods:  childhood, working age, 
and retirement.  An  individual is i ndexed by his family name  w  and his  generation  
t=0,1,2,…  which is identified with the time period of his working age. At the beginning 
of his working age each individual gives birth to an exogenously set number n of chil-
dren, who will bear his family name.  By   t W  we denote the set encompassing the popu-
lation of generation  t  individuals and we let  () t mw be the Lebesgue measure on  t W  
which we assume is well defined. 
 
Human capital endowments   0() h w  of the members of the initial generation 0 are pre-
sumed given.  As a child, i.e. during the time period t-1, each member of generation  
t=1,2,…  receives public education in a uniform amount  1 - t e   which is funded by a pro-
portional education tax on contemporary wage income whose rate is determined by the 
parents generation through a political process. The human capital is attained by the start 
of one’s working age according to the education production function  
 
   
1
11 ()[()], ttt hBhe
ss ww
-
-- =                (1) 
 
with  0 > B  and  , 1 0 < <s  where  1() t h w -  is the parent’s human capital, thus both school 
and family inputs contribute to a child’s human capital accumulation. Note that all indi-
viduals in generation  t  who share a family name w  are identical in their human capital 
attainment.  Wherever possible without loss of clarity we’ll be omitting family identifi-
cation w  for brevity.   
 
During  his working age, an individual inelastically supplies his human capital and re-
ceives wage income  
 
    ()() tt Iwh ww =                   (2) 
 
He is required to contribute a fixed fraction t of his wage income to the public pension 
scheme, and also pays a payroll tax at a rate ?t to finance public public education sys-
tem. He allocates his disposable income to working age consumption  ()
y
t c w  and sav-
ings   () t s w  such that   6 
 
    ( ) ()1()()
y
tttt cwhs wtqww =---             (3) 
 
In his the old age, the generation  t  individual consumes his entire assets equal to the 
sum of  his public pension  1() t pw +  and the gross return on  savings. Thus his old-age 
consumption is given by  
 
    1 ()()()
o
ttt cRs wpww + =+               (4) 
 
Preferences are defined by a utility function  1 (,,)
yo
ttt Ucch +  that is strictly increasing and 
strictly concave in all arguments, where the third argument is the level of human capital 
attained by the children of the individual, which reflects parental altruism. For analytical 
tractability we will consider the case of additively-separable logarithmic utility: 
 
    11 (,,)lnlnln
yoyo
tttttt Ucchcch abg ++ =++          (5) 
 
with  0 , , > g b a .  
 
According to the first-order condition of the individual optimization problem (2)-(4), the 
optimal levels of saving, young-age and old-age consumption are given by, respec-
tively: 
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Since we assume that expenditures on education are financed by a proportional payroll 
tax, the school budget equation is given by 
 
    ttttt neIwh qq ==                 (7) 
   7 
where  t I  and  t h   are, respectively, the average individual wage income and the average 
individual human capital level in the generation  t.  According to the notation introduced 
earlier 
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whereby we note that according to the exogenous population dynamics defined above  
11 ()() tttt n mm ++ W=W . 
 
Combining the expressions (7) and (1) yields the expression for the dynamics of indi-
vidual human capital: 
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Then using (8) we obtain the equation for the dynamics of the average human capital 
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Note that the expression  t M  in equation (10) characterizes the dispersion of h uman 
capital (equivalently, of wage income) in the population. Its highest value is 1, which 
obtains  iff  human capital attainment  is completely homogeneous;  t M  declines with 
increasing dispersion of incomes. Thus equation (10) implies that given the same educa-
tion funding levels the average human capital will grow at the higher rate across genera-
tions the less dispersed are the wage incomes. 
 
We assume that period  t  education tax rate  t q  is determined by majority voting.  In our 
model the current old do not bear the cost nor receive the benefit of education spending 
in period  t. Therefore they are assumed to be indifferent to the vote’s outcome and to 
abstain in the vote. We will discuss the implications of the model’s modifications where 
the elderly participate in the vote, at the end of Section 3. 
 
We will present a comparative analysis of pay-as-you-go (PG) and fully funded (FF) 
public pension schemes, where each can use either a contribution-related or a flat pen-  8 
sion formula.  We will use the self explanatory superscripts PGc, PGf, FFc, and FFf  in  
the notation associated with the respective pension systems.  The pension benefits pro-
vided under the respective schemes are given by  
 
    1 ()()()
FFc
ttt RIRwh pwtwtw + ==              (11a)   
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FFf
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Thus under the fully funded schemes pension benefits are financed by the returns on the 
investment of the beneficiaries’ contributions. While the flat version of the scheme is 
intra-generationally redistributive, the contribution related scheme is equivalent to the 
private saving, albeit at a prescribed rate.  The pay-as-you-go schemes, however, consti-
tute an inter-generational transfer where the benefits to the retirees are funded by taxes 
on the wage income of the contemporary workers. Thus the effective returns to one’s 
contributions into the system are directly tied to wage growth, i.e. to the growth of labor 
productivity in the next generation of workers.  
 
Since the factor prices are exogenous and stationary, physical capital is perfectly mobile 
and the neoclassical technology exhibits constant returns to scale, the supply of human 
capital and the dynamic competitive equilibrium are uniquely determined, for a given 
sequence of education tax rates  t q  and a specified pension scheme, by the allocation 
decisions of individual agents as expressed by the relationships in (6). 
 
As stated above, in each period  t  education tax rate  t q  is determined by majority vot-
ing of the relevant constituents, i.e. the members of generation  t.  In the next section, 
we will derive the most preferred levels of the tax for individual members of the genera-
tion  based on their preferences and resource allocations in the dynamic competitive 
equilibrium. We will also show that this allows one to uniquely and recursively define 
the tax rate chosen by the majority in each period.  We define the recursive dynamic 
political equilibrium (DPE) as the resulting sequence of education tax rates 
0,1,... {} tt q = combined with the corresponding dynamic competitive equilibrium.      9 
 
In our comparative dynamics experiment we compare the economic outcomes in respec-
tive dynamic political equilibria under alternative social security schemes, characterized 
by benefit formulae (11a) – (11d), introduced in period t=0.   In cases of a PG scheme 
this means that the generation of retirees present at t=0 receives the benefits as an unan-




3. Intra-generational redistribution in pension benefit formulas and growth 
 
In this Section, we will compare the effect that the choice of flat vs. contribution related 
benefit formula  has on growth  under either pay-as-you-go or fully funded systems. 
When the pension benefit f ormula is flat it is progressively redistributive within each 
generation of retirees, as opposed to the contribution related pension benefit formula. 
We will therefore show how these pension formulas differ in their impact on incentives 
of different income groups to support funding of public education, via the choice of the 
education tax rate, and thereby on growth.   
 
We will first show that individual preferences are single-peaked with respect to the edu-
cation tax rate. Substituting the consumption  functions given in (6) as well as the ex-
pressions (1) and (7) for the human capital production  into the utility function (5) we 
obtain the expression for the working age individual’s value function  
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    (12) 
 
where  D summarizes the terms that do not depend on  . q  
 
Lemma 1: The value function is strictly concave in q  under either of the pension for-
mulae (11a)-(11d). 
 
Proof. See the Appendix.           
       
According to Lemma 1 each individual has a unique most preferred education tax. Us-
ing the first order condition of maximum of the function 
*() U q  defined in (12) as well   10 
as the relationship (7), we obtain the expression for the tax rate preferred by generation  
t  individual in family w :  
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  in general depends on the value of  
*() t qw. 
 
Under the contribution-related fully funded pension scheme, according to (13) and the 
benefit formula (11a), the choice of the DPE education tax rate is unanimous and con-
stant over time: 
 












             (14a) 
 
Note that since this particular pension scheme is equivalent to a self-financed retire-
ment, the preferred education tax rate given by (14a) is motivated purely by each indi-
vidual’s altruistic concern for the educational attainment of his children in the public 
school system. The unanimity of the preferred tax rate is a consequence of the logarith-
mic  specification of the utility function. Replacing  it by a more general CES form 
would make the preferred tax rates decrease or increase in individual’s income, depend-
ing on the elasticity of substitution between own consumption and children’s education. 
Empirical estimates of income and substitution elasticities suggest that the logarithmic 
(equivalently, Cobb-Douglas) specification of the utility function is a reasonable ap-
proximation (Gradstein et al., 2005, ch. 4), implying that the preferred education tax 
should indeed vary little across incomes under the contribution related fully funded pen-
sion system in the framework at hand.  
 
If a funded scheme uses the flat benefit formula (11b), then the logarithmic utility im-
plies that the preferred tax rate falls with increasing wage income. Indeed, according to 








 and therefore according to (13)    11 




















            (14b) 
 
Thus under this flat pension benefit scheme, similarly to the contribution related case 
described by (14a), all individuals prefer to devote the same, altruistically motivated  
fraction of lifetime income to public education. However, given the redistributive nature 
of the flat scheme this implies that the preferred rate of education tax decreases in indi-




tt I q  stand for the tax rate preferred by generation t individuals whose wage 
equals to the economy’s average. Then according to (14b) and (14a)  ()
FFfFFc
tt I qq = .  
Furthermore, assuming that the median voter earns less than the average wage, a major-
ity of workers under the flat benefit fully funded pension scheme will prefer a higher 
education tax rate than the rate 
FFc q chosen under the contribution-related fully funded 
pension system. Likewise, if the median voter earns an above average wage, then a ma-
jority of workers under the FFf system will prefer a lower education tax rate than 
FFc q .   
 
The following Proposition summarizes the above argument and shows furthermore that 
a similar comparative result holds for the contribution related vs. flat PAYG pension 
schemes.  
 
Proposition 1: (i) Assume that median voter’s wage income is below the average. Then 
for a given pension contribution rate  t  and the pension scheme type (funded or PAYG) 
the DPE education tax rate  t q  in each period  t  will be higher under a flat pension 
benefit formula than under the corresponding contribution-related one.  In other words, 
the following inequalities are true: 
   
FFfFFc
t qq >   and    
PGfPGc
tt qq >    for all t=0,1,… 
(ii) Assume that median voter’s wage income is above the average. Then for a given 
pension contribution rate  t  the respective comparisons yield the results opposite to 
those in part (i), i.e. the following inequalities are true: 
   
FFfFFc
t qq <   and    
PGfPGc
tt qq <    for all t=0,1,… 
 
Proof.  As argued above, the proof for the case of fully funded pensions is established 
by comparing the expressions (14a) and (14b). We will now turn to the case of pay-as-  12 
you-go pensions. Under the contribution-related PG pension scheme, the chosen educa-
tion tax rate is independent of income. Indeed, according to relationships (11c) and (12) 
it satisfies 
   
















      (14c) 
 
Likewise, according to (11d), under the flat benefit PG pension scheme the individual 
preferred education tax rates satisfy the equation 
 
   



















    (14d) 
 
We note that  1 t h +   on the right-hand sides of (14c) and (14d) depends on the education 
tax rates. Lemma 1 implies that (14c) defines a unique unanimously most preferred edu-
cation tax  rate under contribution -related pensions, and that (14d) has a unique  individ-
ual -specific  solution  ()
PGf
t qw . Comparing ( 14c) to (14d) i mmediately shows that 
()
PGfPGc
ttt I qq =   where   ()
PGf
tt I q  is the education tax rate preferred, under the corre-
sponding pension scheme, by generation t individuals whose wage equals to the econ-
omy’s average. Moreover, it is obvious from (14d) that the preferred rate of education 
tax  ()
PGf
t qw  decreases in individuals’ wage income, which implies the Proposition’s 
results for the cases of pay-as-you-go pension systems.   ¦  
 
 
It is clear that the choice of a higher education tax rate will result, ceteris paribus, in 
speedier accumulation of human capital. In the case of a small open economy at hand, 
moreover, it also implies a faster economic growth. Indeed, due to perfect capital mobil-
ity, neoclassical constant returns technology and the assumed stationarity of the interest 
rate, physical capital will be supplied in constant proportion to the human capital, and 
thereby the aggregate output will grow at the rate of human capital accumulation.  Let  
gt  denote  the growth factor of per capita output, then as explained above it is equal to 
the growth factor of the average human capital. Therefore according to (10) 
   13 
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t g , 
FFf
t g , 
PGc
t g , 
PGf
t g  denote the respective per capita growth factors which ob-
tain in the dynamic political equilibria under the pension schemes defined by the benefit 
formulae (9a)-(9d). The relationship (13) along with Proposition 1 leads to the follow-
ing result showing that in a small open economy a social security scheme which gener-
ates greater support for public education funding will also yield relatively speedier eco-
nomic growth at all times t=0,1,…. 
 
Theorem 1: (i) Assume that median voter’s wage income is below the average. Then 
under the provisions of Proposition 1 the economy’s growth rate will be higher in each 
period under a flat, i.e. redistributive among retirees, pension benefit formula (whether 
PAYG or FF) than under the corresponding contribution-related one.  In other words, 
the following inequalities are true: 
   
FFfFFc
tt gg >    and   
PGfPGc
tt gg >    for all t=0,1,… 
(ii) Assume that median voter’s wage income is above the average. Then under the pro-
visions of Proposition 1 the respective comparisons yield the results opposite to those in 
part (i), i.e. contribution related pension benefit formulas are more conducive to eco-
nomic growth. In other words, the following inequalities are true: 
   
FFfFFc
tt gg <    and   
PGfPGc
tt gg <    for all t=0,1,… 
 
Proof.  Observe that according to the relationships (9) and (10) the expression  t M   in 
equation  (15) is i nvariant of the pension scheme and of the education tax rate  t q  .  





-   in equation (15), which is determined by the DPE value of the education 
tax rate corresponding to each of pension systems.  Thus it remains to refer to Proposi-
tion 1. ¦   
 
 
The intuition for the above results is given by the fact that when the pension contribu-
tion rate is fixed and the pension benefit formula is flat, it progressively redistributes 
retirement income within each generation, as opposed to the case of contribution related 
pension benefits. If the pension scheme is fully funded, this means that poorer agents 
will be willing to devote relatively higher fraction of their income to education funding   14 
based on the uniform degree of altruistic motive. Under a PAYG pension scheme, the 
individual rate of return it offers on investment in public education of the next genera-
tion’s workers is likewise higher for the agents with below average income who will 
therefore support relatively higher levels of education funding. Thus, for a given pen-
sion scheme (PAYG or funded) and a given wage income distribution  in which mean 
income exceeds median income (so below average wage earners are in the majority) the 
wage growth will be faster under the flat benefit pension formula, as stated in Proposi-
tion 1(i) and Theorem 1(i).  
 
These results are reversed when the median voter earns more than the average wage. In 
such a situation, moving from a contribution-related pension scheme to a flat benefit 
scheme of the same type at a given contribution rate reduces public investment in edu-
cation and growth. Such a situation may easily occur although empirical wage distribu-
tions always exhibit median below the mean. When education is funded, in addition to 
taxes on wages also through taxes on non-wage income and/or consumption, the elderly 
are no longer indifferent with respect to the choice of the tax level. Since they will not 
benefit from workers’ productivity in the next period, and since they (in our model) do 
not have an operative altruistic motive, unlike the young parents, their preferred tax rate 
is zero. Ordering the individuals by the level of preferred tax rates will then typically 
show that a median voter will be a working age individual with above average wage 
income, even if the wage distribution is skewed right. The current trends in life expec-
tancy and fertility in OECD countries indeed point in the direction of a scenario with the 
median voter earning more than the average wage. Since the tax burden of the old is 
generally not negligible, one may expect that growth effects of a given pension scheme 
will be less favorable under Beveridgean-style flat benefits.       
 
 
4. Funded vs. PAYG pensions  
 
While the previous Section focused on the growth effect of intra-generational redistribu-
tion in a pension benefit formula, we will now turn to the impact of  intergenerational 
transfers. Namely, we will  compare the growth outcomes under the PAYG system, 
which transfers pension benefits from the young to the old, to the growth outcomes un-
der the fully funded (FF) system which is financed by the retirees themselves.  
 
We will first compare the dynamic political equilibrium education tax rates obtained 
under the PAYG and FF. Using the expression (12) for the value function of an individ-
ual as well as the pension benefit formulae (11c) and (11d), we obtain the value function   15 
expressions for the cases of contribution related and flat benefit PAYG systems, respec-
tively: 
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where  1 D   and  2 D   summarize the terms in the respective expressions that do not de-
pend on  . q  
 
Since, according to Lemma 1, both value functions are strictly concave the first order 
conditions of their  maxima uniquely determine the respective individually preferred 
levels of the education tax rate.   
 
In particular, note that under the PAYG system with contribution related benefits pref-
erences are unanimous since the value function (16) is invariant across contemporary 
individuals. We differentiate (16) using the expression (10) and after straightforward 
algebraic transformation we obtain  
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where  1 d   is an expression which is positive for any value of the tax rate   . q   Therefore 
the DPE tax rate 
PGc
t q  is defined by the first order condition 
   ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
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Furthermore, thanks to strict concavity of the value function (16), based on the sign of 










 one can infer the relationship between  
PGc
t q   and the 
DPE tax rate 
FFc q  given by formula (14a), which corresponds to the fully funded con-
tribution related pension benefit scheme. Thus we substitute 
FFc qq =  in the expression 
(18) and verify its sign. This along with formula (15) yields the following result:  
   16 
Proposition 2: For a given social security tax rate  t  and the contribution related re-
tirement benefit formula, the PAYG pension scheme (11c) will result in higher DPE 
education tax rate and per capita growth factor than the FF system (11a), i.e. the fol-
lowing inequalities:   
   
PGcFFc
t qq >   and  
PGcFFc
tt gg >   
are true in a period  t=0,1,… , if and only if the following condition holds:  
 













          (19) 
where  t M  is the expression defined in (10). 
 
 
We now apply a similar analysis to the case of PAYG system with flat benefit formula. 
Differentiating the individual value function (17) we obtain, after straightforward alge-
braic transformations and using the relationship (10): 
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where  2 d   is an expression which is positive for any value of the tax rate  . q    We now 
substitute the value 
FFf
t qq =  given by formula (14b) in the expression (20) and obtain 
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    (21) 
where  3 d   is an expression positive for any  . q    
 
While expressions (20) and (21) are individual-specific, note that they are strictly de-
creasing in individual human capital attainment  () t h w . Therefore under majority voting 
the DPE outcomes for generation  t  will be determined by the median voter’s human 
capital attainment, which we denote by 
med
t h .  Then similarly to the above analysis we   17 
need to examine the sign of expression (21) for   ()
med
tt hh w =  in order to determine the 
relationship between the DPE education tax rates  
FFf
t q and 
PGf
t q  under the respective 
flat benefit social security systems.  This analysis yields the following result:  
 
Proposition 3: For a given pension contribution rate  t  and the flat retirement benefit 
formula, the PAYG pension scheme (11d) will result in higher DPE education tax rate 
and per capita growth factor than the FF system (11b), i.e. the following inequalities: 
        
PGfFFf
tt qq >  and 
PGfFFf
tt gg >   
are true in period  t , if and only if the following condition holds:  
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Discussion.   According to the equation (10) and formulas (14a) and (14b) the left-hand 






 , the real growth fa ctor of the 
economy’s human capital in a DPE under the fully funded pension scheme, with contri-
bution related benefits in the case of inequality (19) and flat benefits in the case of (22). 
The right-hand side  in both  (19) and (22) represents the degree of each individual’s al-
truistic concern for the human capital attainment of his children. It is not difficult to see 
therefore that under the Cobb-Douglas specifications of our model, the inequalities  in 
(19) or (22)  compare the altruistic return on investment in education ,  which is  its only 
motive under an FF pension system , to the marginal economic return  in terms of pen-
si on benefits under a PAYG scheme on additional investment in education, beyond the 
tax rate prescribed by the respective FF system (
FFc q  or 
FFf
t q  respectively).  Indeed, a 
PAYG scheme brings about an additional non-altruistic motive to finance public educa-
tion since it increases wage incomes in the next generation, of which the retirees will 
receive a share under PAYG scheme. Specifically, if the inequality (19) is satisfied, the 
return to future retirees generated by such additional education funding under the PAYG 
system is high enough; hence the result of Proposition 2 that the PAYG system would 
yield a  relatively  higher education tax rate than the respective FF system, thus    
PGcFFc
t qq > . This result may be overturned, however, when inequality (19) is violated  
because the preferred tax based on the altruistic motive declines if the move to a PAYG 
scheme reduces lifetime income when the rate of return on social security contributions 
falls short of the interest rate.   18 
 
As pointed out in Section 2 following the equation (10), the value of expression  t M  is 
at most 1, which obtains only if human capital levels are identical across contemporary 
individuals, and furthermore  t M  declines with increasing dispersion of incomes/human 
capital levels. Thus conditions in (19) and (22) impose a bound on the degree of income 
inequality.  
 
Propositions 2 and 3 show in particular, according to the conditions (19) and (22), that 
the scenario where DPE education tax rate and the growth rate of per capita GDP will 
be higher under a PAYG scheme than under the respective funded system is likely in an 
environment with some of the following features: moderate degree of inequality, strong 
public education system (B is relatively large), the wage income of a median voter is 
below the economy’s average and a culture where parents give relatively low priority to 
the human capital attainment of their children  (?  relatively small). 
 
We note that the conditions listed above are characteristic of developed economies. We 
also remark that when  the median voter’s wage is below the economy’s average, the 
inequality (19) automatically implies (22). 
 
Combining the results of Propositions 2 and 3 with those of Proposition 1(i) and Theo-
rem 1(i) we obtain the main result of this section: 
 
Theorem 2:  Consider the DPE outcomes in otherwise identical  four  small open 
economies, where condition (19) is satisfied and median voter’s wage is below the 
economy’s average, but which use different alternative pension schemes defined by the 
formulae (11a)-(11d) with the same pension contribution rate  t  at t=0,1,….  The econ-
omy using the PAYG social security system with flat benefit pension formula (PGf) de-
livers the highest DPE education tax rates and per capita growth rates.   
 
 
We can thus conclude that under the conditions characteristic of (small open) developed 
economies the PAYG flat benefit social security system, i.e. the one most redistributive 
both between and within generations is most conducive, relative to the alternatives sys-
tems given the same contribution rate, of public investment in human capital and hence 
economic growth. As we explained earlier, the role of intergenerationally redistributive 
feature of the PAYG system is that it provides an economic incentive to fund the next 
generation’s education, through the link between the retiree pension benefits and their   19 
contemporary workers’ productivity.  The pension formula which is progressively redis-
tributive among the retirees enhances the majority’s support for higher rates of educa-
tion taxes, provided that the electorate’s income distribution is right-skewed.   
 
An essential assumption in Theorem 2 is that the median voter is a worker earning a 
below average wage, which makes Theorem 1(i) applicable.  If instead the median 
voter’s wage was above the average, then Theorem 1(ii) would apply, and combining it 
with Propositions 2 and 3 one would obtain, given that both (19) and (22) remained sat-
isfied, that it is the contribution-related PAYG scheme that delivers the highest educa-
tion tax and the fastest growth.  Although wage distributions are typically right-skewed, 
note that as argued in the Discussion at the end of Section 3, under a public finance sys-
tem where retirees are also subject to the education tax, they would be in opposition to 
it, so the median voter on the issue would likely be a worker earning more than the av-
erage wage. 
 
The above results on the effects of pension schemes on education funding and growth 
raise a question whether they are associated with technological  inefficiencies in re-
source allocations. In this event, output growth is not at its maximum for given levels of 
aggregate investment in human and physical capital. We note that an intertemporal allo-









 holds at 
the margin.  Indeed, w hen the marginal product of public education exceeds that of 
physical capital, an intergenerational Pareto improvement can be achieved by investing 
more in public education rather than in physical capital, where the government debt can 
be repaid by taxing the active generation in the next period. If such a scenario occurs, an 
obvious question is why the government does not pursue the policy of greater funding 
of education anyway. In the real world economies, the government institutions respon-
sible  for funding public education face  hard fiscal constraints, including the caps on 
borrowing. Besides, in many countries education funding is provided at a regional or 
even local level making it difficult to capture the productivity gains resulting from ju-
risdiction specific education investment.  
 









 is true. If contracts with minors could be enforced, parents would simply 
transfer the necessary amount to finance the efficient level of education. The children 
would repay their debt with interest in the next period. Altruistic parents could then   20 
make some additional transfer in the form of physical capital or the final good, either 
inter vivos or as a bequest. Therefore, if parents are indifferent between giving the same 
amount of money as education funding or in cash, overinvestment in education can oc-
cur only if the pension scheme redistributes toward the median voter.   Since the altruis-
tic motive may well be too weak to ensure a sufficiently high level of public education, 
the PAYG scheme can act as a device to enhance welfare by promoting investment in 
human capital.   
 
 
5.  The choice of a pension scheme 
 
The results of the previous section show that for a wide range of parameters characteris-
tic of developed economies a PAYG  pension  scheme tends to generate support for 
higher public funding of education than a comparable FF system would. The above re-
sults characterize a comparison of otherwise identical  four open economies where the 
alternative social security systems (FFc, FFf, PGc, PGf ) are in place and are not them-
selves subject to public choice. In order to approach the latter issue, we need to compare 
these alternative pension systems in terms of rates of return they generate for their con-
stituents. The clear benchmark for this comparison is the FF system with contribution 
related benefit formula (11a) which provides each retiree the benefit return on his con-
tributions equal to the return on private savings under the interest factor R.  
 
Let   ()
S
t rw  be the rate of return a pension system S (i.e., one of the four alternative ar-
rangements FFc, FFf, PGc, PGf under consideration) provides for generation t  individ-
ual in family w   on his contributions into the system.  As mentioned above, 
       ()
FFc
t R rw ”                       (23) 
Therefore, according to (11b), 










=                     
and thereby the median voter’s return to his social security contributions is given by 







rw =                     (24) 
Further, according to formulae (11c) and (10) the PAYG system with contribution re-
lated benefit formula provides each individual in generation  t  the rate of return 
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on his social security contributions, where as before  
PGc
t q  stands for the DPE education 
tax rate chosen by generation   t  if this pension system is in place. 
 
The education tax rate qˆ that induces the rate of return on social security contributions 
under a contribution-related PAYG scheme to become equal to the interest factor R is 


















w                  (26) 
 
Similarly, according to (11d) and (10), the rate of such return for a generation t individ-
ual in family w  under PAYG system with this redistributive flat benefit formula will be  
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- - + ==             (27) 
We will first focus on the comparison of this rate of return to the return on private sav-
ings, i.e. the interest factor R.  According to (27) for these factors to be equal the educa-
tion tax rate q  chosen under the PGf pension system would have to satisfy the equation  











-- =                  (28) 
i.e. to be equal to  


















                (29) 
 
Since according to (27) the rate of return on pension benefits is an increasing function 
of the education tax rate  q  , the comparison of   ()
PGf
t rw  to  R  is equivalent to that of  
()
PGf
t qw  to   () qw.   The result of the latter comparison is obtained similarly to our 
proof of Proposition 3, i.e. by substituting    () qqw =  into the formula (20) of the mar-







  and verifying its sign.  Namely, due to strict concavity of the 
value function the inequality   ()()
PGf









.  A 
straightforward application of this analysis to the median voter and proceeding analo-
gously for the contribution-related-formulas yields the following results.  
   22 
Proposition  4:  (i) The inequality  ()
PGfmed
t qqw <   and equivalently  ()
PGfmed
t R rw<  
are true, i.e. the median voter’s return on pension contributions under PAYG flat bene-
fit social security system falls short of the return on private savings, iff the following 
condition holds:  
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(ii) The inequality  q q ˆ < PGc
t  and equivalently  R PGc
t < r  are true, i.e. the return under 
PAYG contribution-related social security systems falls short of the return on private 
savings, iff the following condition holds:  
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It can be easily seen  that inequalities (30a) and (30b) are broadly consistent with the 
conditions (19) and (22), i.e. both sets of conditions are satisfied for a wide subset of the 
range of parameters. Specifically, (30a) and (30b) impose reasonable upper bounds on 
fertility n, the productivity parameter B of the public education system, as well as skew-






 .   
 
Recall that according to Theorem 2, if condition (19) is satisfied, then growth will be 
the fastest under the PGf pension formula. Therefore, noting that when the distribution 
of wages is right-skewed redistributive pension formulas are preferred to the contribu-
tion-related formulas by a majority of voters, we confine our attention to the choice be-
tween pension schemes with a redistributive (flat) benefit formula. We now couple the 
result of Proposition 4 with that of Proposition 1(i) and based on formulas (23)-(25) and 
(27) obtain the following: 
 
Theorem 3:  Consider a small open economy which satisfies the parametric conditions 
(19), (22) and (30a). Assume that a pension scheme is to be chosen in period  t  among 
the alternatives defined by the formulae (11a)-(11d) with a given pension contribution 
rate  t , and that the corresponding DPE education tax rate is determined accordingly 
(as described by (14a)-(14d)). Then the corresponding rates of return to pension contri-
butions of a median worker in generation  t  will compare as follows:   23 
        ()()
FFfmedFFcPGfmedPGc
tttt R rwrrwr >”>>          (31) 
regardless of what pension system, if any, was in place prior to period  t. 
 
 
Since according to (31) the return to social security contributions is higher under the 
funded scheme, then other things equal including the same level of education tax rate, 
the welfare level of every working age individual will be higher under a fully funded 
than under the corresponding PAYG scheme. Propositions 2 and 3 state, furthermore, 
that the majority of young agents will choose lower education tax rates under fully 
funded schemes. Thus this revealed preference argument proves the following: 
 
Corollary:  Under the provisions of Theorem 3 a majority of young voters in each gen-
eration  t  will prefer a fully funded system over a PAYG arrangement.    
 
It is obvious, however, that retirees in each period will be unequivocally in favor of a 
PAYG arrangement.
4 Even if there are fewer old people in the economy than those in 
the working age, the median voter in the combined electorate on the issue of choosing a 
social security system will be, as also pointed out by Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2005), a 
low income young agent, such that the inequality (30a) can be violated.
5  In this likely 
scenario the PGf social security system will be sustained despite the wishes of the ma-
jority of the working population. The important implication of our results stemming 
from Theorem 2 is that this scenario is characterized by consistently higher rates of 
economic growth.  
 
Therefore, while according to the Corollary the majority of young agents always prefer 
to deviate from the PGf social security system based on their lifetime welfare maximi-
zation, this individually rational incentive ignores the benefit these agents have received 
from the past higher growth rates due in part to the PAYG system which was in place in 
prior periods. It similarly ignores the longer-term benefits of economic growth for the 
future generations, if the PAYG system is sustained.  
 
                                                 
4 In a more realistic OLG framework with multiple coexisting age cohorts older cohorts 
of workers would join the retirees in their support of a PAYG scheme (see e.g. Brown-
ing, 1975).  
   24 
We can thus conclude:  While the intergenerational transfer system with PGf pension 
scheme is sustained due to the support of all of the old and a minority of the young, it 
causes  a majority of the young to support higher public funding of education and 





This paper challenges the common concern that PAYG schemes harm growth. This is 
believed to be the case due to the negative effect of PAYG systems on physical capital 
formation. We abstract away from this concern by considering the case of a small open 
economy with open capital markets and focus instead on the effect of pension systems 
on human capital accumulation. We consider an economy where human capital accumu-
lation is publicly financed, which seems to be a valid description of the situation in most 
OECD countries. We show, using a political economy framework, that the introduction 
of PAYG pension schemes can have a positive effect on economic growth. The reason 
is that a majority of voters will support higher taxes tor finance public education today 
when they can expect to receive higher PAYG pensions tomorrow in return. In this way, 
PAYG pension scheme can serve as a device to overcome a tendency toward underin-
vestment in public education.  
  
Furthermore, an intra-generationally redistributive PAYG scheme (for example the one 
where benefits are flat rather than contribution related)  may lead to an even faster 
growth. Indeed, investment in public education will be higher if the median voter bene-
fits from redistribution in PAYG pension benefits.  One should, however, balance this 
against a counteracting effect of a labor supply response to the redistributive policy.  
 
An obvious alternative to our framework would be a specification in which public edu-
cation can be supplemented by private education, as a perfect substitute. In such a 
framework, the preferred education tax of all individuals with more than average in-
come would be zero when a funded pension scheme is in place. Should the preferred 
education tax of poorer voters rise with increasing income, an ends-against-the-middle 
coalition may be formed as in Epple and Romano (1996), where the median voter has 
less than the median wage. Although some private schooling is crowded out by increas-
                                                                                                                                               
5 When voters choose the rate of contribution to a redistributive scheme, the winning 
coalition often consists of retirees and workers with medium wages, who prefer higher 
contribution rates than rich or poor workers (Casamatta et al., 2000).     25 
ing public schooling in such a mixed education regime, the tendency of a positive im-
pact of extending PAYG schemes on aggregate investment in education will continue to 
hold. 
 
The main caveat of our analysis obviously lies in the assumption that the choice of a 
pension system has no effect on the level of physical capital in a small open economy. It 
is important to point out, however, that even  if each economy under consideration is 
small compared to the rest of the world, a symmetric choice of pension policies in all 
countries, which may be favorable to growth from the perspective of each individual 
country, can under certain conditions have a negative impact on global physical capital 
formation.  
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Lemma 1. 
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